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Until about twenty years ago, economists neglected the study of tech-
nological change, with adverse effects on both the quality and usefulness
ofeconomic analysis. During the past twenty years, a substantial corpus
of knowledge has been developed in this area, and much of it is being
used by policymakers in both the public and private sectors. Despite the
advances that have been made, the gaps in ourknowledge are great. The
economics oftechnological change, while healthy and growing, is still at
the stage where many of the basic facts, and theories are missing.
In the past two years, I have been engaged in a number ofinterrelated
studies ofR&D, innovation, and technological change. These studies
have been concerned with a variety oftopics, ranging from the composi-
tion of R&D expenditures to international technology transfer, from
price indexes for R&D inputs to the effects of government R&D on
private R&D. At this point, many of these studies have reached the
point where some of the major findings are in hand, even though much
more remains to be done before ourunderstanding ofthe relevant topics
is reasonably satisfactory.
The purpose ofthis paper is to bring together and discuss some ofthe
empirical findings that have emerged. To keep the paperto a reasonable
length, I shall have to be very selective and brief. Only a few findings of
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each study can be presented. In a sense, this paper provides a partial and
preliminaryoverviewofsome ofthe recentworkI have beendoing in this
area. Since the various studies are interrelated in many ways, such an
overview should be useful.
6.2 Composition of R&D: Effects and Determinants
To begin with, let's consider the composition ofR&D expenditures.
In my opinion, economists have devoted too little attention to this topic.
For both analytical and policy purposes, the total R&D figures are hard
to interpret because they include such a heterogeneous mixture ofactivi-
ties. Basicresearch and applied research are mixed upwith development.
Long-term projects are mixed up with short-term projects. Projects
aimed at small product and process improvements are mixed up with
projects aimed at major new processes and products. Process R&D is
mixed up with productR&D. To answer many important analytical and
policy questions, it is essential to disaggregate R&D.
Unfortunately, little work has been done on this score. To help fill this
gap, I have tried to (1) estimate the effects of the composition of an
industry's or firm's R&D expenditures on its rate of productivity
increase (when its total R&D expenditures are held constant), (2)
investigate the relationship between the composition of a firm's R&D
expenditures and its innovative output, as measured by the number of
majorinnovations introduced, and (3) determine whatfactors are associ-
atedwith the composition ofa firm's R&D expenditures, with particular
attention being directed at firm size and industrial concentration.
1
At least four findings emerge from these studies. First, holding con-
stant the amount spent on applied R&D and basic research, an indus-
try's rate of productivity increase between 1948 and 1966 seems to have
beendirectly relatedto the extentits R&D was long-term. Althoughthe
interpretation of this result is by no means clear-cut, it certainly is
suggestive. Aspointedoutelsewhere,2many firms tendto concentrateon
short-term, technically safe R&D projects. Particularly in recent years,
some observers, including both public policymakers and top officials of
the firms themselves, have begun to question the wisdom of this empha-
sis.
Second, when a firm's totalR&D expenditureswere held constant, its
innovative output seemed to be directly related to the percentage of its
R&D expenditures devoted to basic research. The data on which this
result is based pertain to the chemical and petroleum industries, areas
1. Some results of these studies have been published in Mansfield (1980). Additional
results appear in Mansfield (1981a). Link (1981) also has been investigating factors associ-
ated with the composition of R&D.
2. For recent evidence on this subject, see Mansfield (1981b).129 R&D and Innovation
where we have accumulated a considerable amount of data concerning
the R&D and innovative activities of particular firms. It would be
extremely useful if a similar investigation could be made of other indus-
tries. In view of the roughness of both the data and the analysis, this
finding should be viewed as preliminary and tentative. In particular, it is
hardto tell whetherbasicresearch is the relevantvariable, orwhetherit is
a surrogate for something else.
Third, based on data obtained from 108 firms that account for about
one-half of all industrial R&D expenditures in the United States, the
composition of a firm's R&D expenditures appears to be related to the
firm's size. But the relationship is not as simple as one might think.
Whereas the largest firms seem to carry out a disproportionately large
share of the basic research (and perhaps the long-term R&D) in most
industries, they do not tend consistently to carryout a disproportionately
large share of the relatively risky R&D or the R&D aimed at entirely
new products and processes. Instead, they generally seem to carry out a
disproportionately small share of the R&D aimed at entirely new
products and processes. These results are not contradictory. Basic re-
search is by no means the same thing as R&D aimed at entirely new
products and processes. Also, since both basic research and applied R &
D can be relatively risky, the riskiness of a firm's R&D need not be
closely correlated with the percentage of its R&D devoted to basic
research.
Fourth, the moreconcentratedindustries in oursampleseem to devote
a smaller, notlarger, percentageofR&D expendituresto basicresearch.
This relationship is statistically significant, but not very strong (?- == .46).
Relatively concentrated industries also tend to devote a relatively small,
not large, proportion of their R&D expenditures to long-term projects
and to projects aimed at entirely new products and processes, but the
correlation (in eachcase?-is about .09) is far from statisticallysignificant.
A positive correlation does exist (?- == .15) between an industry's concen-
tration level and the proportion of its R&D expenditures going for
relatively risky projects, but this correlation too is far from significant.
6.3 Price Indexes for R&D Inputs
Not only is relatively little known about the composition of R&D
expenditures, but equally important, the available data concerning real
R&D expenditures are bedeviled by the lack ofa suitable price index for
R&D inputs. In view ofthe inherent difficulties and the strong assump-
tions underlying the few alternative measures that have been proposed,
the official government R&D statistics use the GNP deflator to deflate
R&D expenditures. Many observers inside and outside the government(1)
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are uncomfortable with this procedure, but little is known about the size
or direction of the errors it introduces.
To help fill this gap, we constructedprice indexesfor R&D inputs and
for inputs used in other stages of the innovative process. Detailed data
were obtained from thirty-two firms in the following eight industries:
chemicals; petroleum; electrical equipment; primary metals; fabricated
metal products; rubber; stone, clay, and glass; and textiles. These indus-
tries account for about halfofthecompany-financedR&D in the United
States. Although our sample contains both large and small firms, it
includes a substantial proportion of the R&D carried out in these
industries. Indeed, the firms in oursample accountfor aboutone-ninthof
all company-financed R&D in the United States.
3
Atleastfour findings stemfrom this study. First, for these industries as
a whole, the Laspeyres price index for R&D inputs indicates that the
price of such inputs was about 98 percent higher in 1979 than in 1969.
However, the rate of inflation in R&D seems to have been higher in
someindustries thanin others. Inparticular, therateofinflation seemsto
have been highest in fabricated metal products, chemicals, and petro-
leum, and lowest in electrical equipment.
Second, turning to the innovation process as a whole, Laspeyres price
indexes indicate that the price of inputs into all stages of the innovative
process was about 101 percent higher in 1979 than in 1969. Thus, the rate
of inflation for inputs into all stages of the innovation process seems to
have been somewhat higher than for R&D alone. As in the case of
R&D, the rate of inflation for inputs into all stages of the innovation
processseemedtobehighestin fabricatedmetalproducts,chemicals, and
petroleum, and lowest in electrical equipment.
Third, if we assume that the production function for R&D in each
industry is Cobb-Douglas (with constant returns to scale), an exact price
index for each industry is
I == .TI (P1i ) (Xi X 100,
l=1 POi
where the price ofthe ith input in 1979 is PI;' its price in 1969 is POi, (Xi is
theproportionofR&D cost devotedto theithinput, andn is thenumber
of inputs.
4 Even though there is little or no information concerning the
nature ofthe production function for R&D, it is interesting to compare
the resulting indexes with the Laspeyres indexes because, since Las-
peyres indexes ignore substitution effects, they may exaggerate price
increases. Table 6.1 shows the results for each industry. As you can see,
3. This work is being done with Anthony Romeo and Lorne Switzer. For a preliminary
account of some of our findings, see Mansfield, Romeo, and Switzer (1983). For some
previous work, see Goldberg (1978) and Jaffe (1972).
4. For a proof of this, see Mansfield, Romeo, and Switzer (1983).131 R&D and Innovation
Table 6.1 Price Indexes for R&D Inputs and for Inputs in the Innovative
Process, Eight Industries, 1979 (1969 = 100)3
Laspeyres Index
Innovation Cobb-Douglas
Industry R&D Process R&D
Chemicals 222 223 217
Petroleum 222 228 218
Electrical equipment 183 186 190
Primary metals 205 210 205
Fabricated metal products 248 275 222
Rubber 209 200 206
Stone, clay, and glass 205 195 183
Textiles 200 220 220
Mean
b 198 201 200
Source: See section 6.3.
aThe three columns are not entirely comparable because some firms could be included in
some columns but not others because of lack of data. For the innovation process, some
figures have been rounded to the nearest 5 or 0 to indicate their roughness.
bEach industry's price index is weighted by its 1969 R&D expenditure.
those based on the Cobb-Douglas assumption are generally quite similar
to those based on the Laspeyres indexes. On the average, the Cobb-
Douglas indexes indicate that the price of R&D inputs was about 100
percent higher in 1979 than in 1969.
Fourth, in practically all of the industries included here, the rate of
increase ofthe price index for R&D inputs exceededthe rateofincrease
ofthe GNPdeflator. Becauseoftheinadequacies ofthe GNPdeflatorfor
this purpose, the official U.S. statistics concerning deflated R&D
expenditures seem to overestimate the increase during 1969-79 in indus-
trialR&Dperformance. Forthese industries as a whole, deflatedR&D
expenditures increased by about 7 percent (during the period, not
annually) based on the GNP deflator, but only by less than 1 percent
based on our price indexes for R&D inputs. Taken at face value, this
seems to indicate that the bulk ofthe apparent increase in real R&D in
these industries was due to the inadequacies of the GNP deflator.
6.4 Effects of Federal Support on Privately Financed R&D
Just as the lack ofR&D price indexes has long been recognized, the
needfor moreinformationontheeffectsofgovernmentR&Donprivate
R&D has also long been known. This area has been the subject of
considerable controversy. Some economists argue that increases in gov-
ernment R&D funding are likely to reduce expenditures ofthe private
sector because (among other reasons) firms may receive government132 Edwin Mansfield
support for some projects they would otherwise finance themselves.
Other economists say that government R&D is complementary to
private R&D, that increases in the former stimulate increases in the
latter. This question is of great importance for both policy and analysis,
but little is known about it.
To study the effects offederal support on privately financed R&D in
the important area of energy, we chose a sample of twenty-five major
firms in the chemical, oil, electrical equipment, and primary metals
industries. Together they carryover 40 percent of all R&D in these
industries. To estimate the extent to which these firms obtained govern-
mentfunding for energyR&D projects thatthey would have carried out
in any eventwith theirownfunds, we obtaineddetailed datafrom eachof
thefirms. Moreover, evenmoredetaileddatawereobtainedconcerning a
sample of forty-one individual federally funded energy R&D projects.
These projects account for over 1 percent of all federally supported
energy R&D performed by industries.
5
The following are four of the conclusions stemming from this study.
First, these firms apparently would have financed only a relatively small
proportion of the energy R&D that they performed with government
support. Based on our sample of firms, they would have financed only
about3percentontheirown. Basedonoursampleofindividualprojects,
they would have financed about 20 percent. It would be useful if similar
estimatescouldbeobtainedforvarious kinds ofR&Doutsidethefield of
energy.
Second, if a 10 percent increase were to occur in federal funding for
their energy R&D in 1979, the response (for all twenty-five firms taken
as a whole) would be that, for each dollar increase in federal support,
theywould increase theirown supportofenergyR&D by aboutsix cents
per year for the first two years after the increase in federal funds. In the
thirdyearaftertheincrease, therewould beno effect atall. This finding is
based on careful estimates by senior R&D officials of each firm.
However, substantialdifferences exist amongthefirms' responses. These
results are quite consistent with those obtained by Levin (1981) and
Terleckyj and Levy (1981) in their econometric studies ofthe aggregate
relationship between federally funded R&D expenditures and privately
funded R&D expenditures.
Third, if a 10 percent cut were to occur in federal funding for their
energy R&D in 1979, the response (for all twenty-five firms taken as a
whole) would be that, for each dollar cut in federal support, they would
reduce their own support ofenergy R&D by about twenty-five cents in
each ofthe two years following the cut. In the third year after the federal
cut, they would cut about nineteen cents in their own spending. Taken at
5. This work is being conducted with Lorne Switzer.133 R&D and Innovation
face value, a 10 percent cut in federally funded energy R&D would
apparently have a bigger effect on privately funded energy R&D than
would a 10 percentincrease. Butuntil more and betterdata are obtained,
we feel that this difference should be viewed with considerable caution.
Fourth, in modeling the effects of federally funded R&D on the
economy, our results indicate that it may be more realistic to view such
R&D as a factor thatfacilitates andexpands theprofitabilityofprivately
fundedR&D, ratherthanfocus solely (as mosteconometricstudies have
done) on the direct effects offederally funded R&D on the productivity
ofthe firms and industriesperformingtheR&D. Basedonoursample of
federally funded projects, such projects typically appear to make only
about half as large a direct contribution to the firm's performance and
productivity as would be achieved if the firm spent an equivalent amount
ofmoneyonwhateverR&Dit chose. Butin aboutone-thirdofthecases,
the federally financed R&D projectssuggested somefurtherR&D into
which the firm invested its own funds. (As shown in table 6.2, the
likelihood of such a spin-off is enhanced if the firm helped to formulate
the ideas on which the project is based, and if the project was not
completely separated physically from the projects financed by the firm.)6
If federally funded R&D is viewed in this way, econometricians may
have more success in measuring its effects on productivity in the private
sector.
6.5 Forecasts of Engineering Employment
Engineering manpoweris one ofthe mostimportantinputs required in
the complex process leading to innovation and technological change.
Policymakers in government, universities, and business must make deci-
sions that depend, explicitly or implicitly, on forecasts of the number of
engineers employed in various sectors of the economy at various times.
For example, in evaluating the adequacy of existing engineering man-
power, the National Science Foundation and the Bureau ofLabor Statis-
tics must try to forecast how many engineers will be employed in the
private sector. Although such forecasts sometimes are based on a collec-
tion of forecasts made by firms of their own engineering employment,
little is known about the accuracy of these forecasts.
Tohelpfill this gap, a detailedeconometricstudywas carriedout. Data
were obtained from a well-known engineering association which has
collected such forecasts from firms for many years. For fifty-four firms in
6. Of course, we recognize the difficulty in many cases of identifying where the ideas
underlying a particular project originated. But in the cases in table 6.2, this generally
seemed to be a matterofagreement among all parties. Note too that, whereas the source of
the project seems to have a statistically significant effect, the separation variable is not
significant when both variables are included.134 Edwin Mansfield
Table 6.2 Percentage of Federally Financed Energy R&D Projects Resulting
in Company-Financed R&D Done Subsequently by the Performer,
by Source of Idea for Project, and by Extent of Separation from
Company-Financed Projects, Forty Projects
a
Characteristic of Project
Source of idea for project:
Firm
Government










Source: See section 6.4.
aOne project could not be included because it was not yet clear whether it would result in
company-financed R&D. The figures in this table may understate the true percentages
because they pertain only to company-financed R&D resulting directly and almost
immediately from these projects.
the aerospace, electronics, chemical, andpetroleumindustries, compari-
sons were made ofeach firm's forecasted engineering employment with
its actual engineering employment during 1957-76. Since data were
obtainedfor a number offorecasts ofeach firm, the accuracy of218 such
forecasts could be evaluated.
7
At least three conclusions stem from this study. First, there appear to
have beensubstantial differences among industries in the accuracy ofthe
forecasts. As shown in table 6.3, the forecasting errors for individual
firms in the areospaceindustrywere muchgreaterthanin theelectronics,
chemical, or petroleum industries. (In chemicals and petroleum, firms'
two-year forecasts were off, on the average, only by about 5 percent.)
Therelativelylargeforecasting errorsin the aerospace industrymayhave
been caused by its heavy dependence on government defense and space
programs which were volatile and hard to predict.
Second, although the forecasting errors for individual firms were sub-
stantial, they tend to be smaller when we consider the total engineering
employment for all firms in the sample. On the average, the six-month
forecasts were in errorby about2percent, the two-yearforecasts were in
error by about 1 percent, and the five-year forecasts were in error by
about 3 percent. The fact that little bias was present in the forecasts is
encouraging since, for many purposes, the central aim is to forecast total
engineering employment in an entire sector of the economy, not the
engineering employment of a particular firm.
Third, the firms' forecasts may be improved if a simple econometric
model is used. Based on datafrom over a dozen chemical and petroleum
7. This work was done with Peter Brach. Some of the results appear in Brach and
Mansfield (1982).135 R&D and Innovation
Table 6.3 Frequency Distribution of Forecasts, by Ratio of Forecasted to
Actual Engineering Employment, Aerospace, Electronics,





Actual Employment Aerospace Electronics Petroleum Chemical
Number of 6-Month Forecasts
0.81-0.90 0 1 0 0
0.91-1.00 8 10 12 6
1.01-1.10 7 9 13 9
1.11-1.20 0 2 0 1
1.21-1.30 2 0 0 0
1.31-1.40 2 0 0 0
Number of 2-Year Forecasts
0.61-0.70 0 1 0 0
0.71-0.80 2 3 0 0
0.81-0.90 4 3 4 1
0.91-1.00 2 9 8 1
1.01-1.10 3 6 6 5
1.11-1.20 0 0 0 0
1.21-1.30 0 3 0 0
1.31-1.40 3 0 0 0
Source: See section 6.5.
aFive-year and ten-year forecasts were also included in the study but are not in this table.
firms, the proportion of the way that a firm's engineering employment
moves towardthe desired level is inversely relatedtothe desiredpercent-
age increase in engineering employment
8 and is directly related to the
profitability of the firm. (A similar model was used in Mansfield 1968.)
Using information concerning this relationship in the past as well as the
firm's desired level of engineering employment in the future, one can
forecast the firm's future engineering employment. The evidence, while
fragmentary and incomplete, suggests that experimentation with such an
approach may be worthwhile.
6.6 International Technology Transfer
To understand a wide variety oftopics, ranging from economic growth
to industrial organization, economists must be concerned with interna-
tional technology transfer. In my opinion, economists interested in the
8. This model assumes that desired employmentexceeds actual employment, which was
the typical case in these firms in the relevant time periods. Obviously, this model should be
used only in cases where this assumption is true.136 Edwin Mansfield
relationship betweenR&D andproductivityincrease have paidtoolittle
attention to this subject. In practically all econometric models designed
to relate R&D to productivity increase, international technology flows
arenotincluded (explicitlyatleast). YetU.S.-basedfirms carryoutabout
10 percent of their R&D overseas, and this R&D has an effect on the
rate of productivity increase in the United States. In addition (and
probablymore important), R&D carriedout by one organizationin one
country often has a significant effect on technological advance and pro-
ductivity increase in another organization in another country. For exam-
ple, productivity increase in the American chemical industry was cer-
tainly influencedbytheworkofZieglerin GermanyandofNattain Italy.
To shed new light on the process ofinternational technology transfer,
we have carried out several types of studies. One study was concerned
with the channels ofinternational technology transfer and the effects of
international technology transfer on U.S. R&D expenditures. Another
study was concerned with the size and characteristics ofoverseas R&D
carriedoutby U.S.-basedfirms. Still anotherstudydealtwith the transfer
of technology by U.S.-based firms to their overseas subsidiaries.
9 Based
on these studies, it seems that economists should reconsider some ofthe
models that have been used most frequently to represent the process of
international technology transfer.
The traditional way ofviewing the process ofinternational technology
transfer has been built around the concept of the product life cycle. 10
According to the product life cycle, a fairly definite sequence exists in the
relationship between technology and trade, whereby the United States
tends to pioneerin the development ofnew products, enjoying for a time
a virtual monopoly. After an innovation occurs, the innovator services
foreign marketsthroughexports, accordingto this model. Asthe technol-
ogy matures and foreign markets develop, companies begin building
plants overseas, and U.S. exports may be displaced by production of
foreign subsidiaries. The concept ofthe product life cycle has had a great
influence in recent decades because it has been able to explain the trainof
events in many industries.
Atleastfour ofourfindings seemrelevant in this regard. First, ourdata
suggest that the situation may be changing, that the product life cycle
may be less valid than in the past. By the mid-1970s, in the bulk of the
cases we studied, the principal channel through which new technologies
were exploited abroad during the first five years after their commer-
cialization was foreign subsidiaries, not exports (see table 6.4). About 75
percentofthe technologies transferred by U.S. firms to their subsidiaries
in developed countries during 1969-78 were less than five years old.
9. See Mansfield, Romeo, and Wagner (1979); Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo (1979);
Mansfield and Romeo (1980).
10. Vernon (1966, 1970).137 R&D and Innovation
Table 6.4 Percentage Distribution of R&D Projects, by Anticipated Channel
of International Technology Transfer, First Five Years after
Commercialization, Twenty-Three Firms, 1974
Channel of Technology Transfer
Foreign Joint
Subsidiary Exports Licensing Venture Total
a
All R&D projects
b 74 15 9 2 100
Projects aimed at:
c
Entirely new product 72 4 24 a 100
Product improvement 69 9 23 a 100
Entirely new process 17 83 a a 100
Process improvement 45 53 2 1 100
Source: See section 6.6.
aBecause of rounding errors, percentages mat not sum to 100.
bThis is the mean ofthe percentage for sixteen industrial firms and for seven majorchemical
firms. The results are much the same in the two subsamples. Only projects where foreign
returns were expected to be ofsome importance (more than 10 percent ofthe total for the
first subsample and 25 percent of the total for the second subsample) were included.
COnly the chemical subsample could be included.
Basedonourdata, the "exportstage" ofthe product cycle has often been
truncated and sometimeseliminated. Particularlyfor new products, firms
frequently begin overseas production within one year offirst U.S. intro-
duction. In some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, new products com-
monly are introduced by U.S.-based firms more quickly in foreign
markets than in the United States (in part because of regulatory consid-
erations).
Second, there seems to be a difference in this regard between products
and processes. For processes, the "export stage" continues to be impor-
tant (table 6.4). Firms are more hesitant to send theirprocess technology
overseas than their product technology because they feel that the diffu-
sion of process technology, once it goes abroad, is harder to control. In
their view, it is much more difficult to determine whether foreign firms
are illegally imitating a process than a product.
Third, to a large extent, this change in the process of international
technology transfer and trade reflects the fact that many U.S.-based (and
foreign-based) firms have come to take a worldwide view of their opera-
tions. Many ofthem now have in place extensive overseas manufacturing
facilities. Asindicated above, many also havesubstantialR&D activities
located abroad. Given the existing worldwide network of facilities and
people, firms are trying to optimize their overall operations. This may
mean that some of the technology developed in the United States may
find its initial application in a Canadian subsidiary, or that an innovation138 Edwin Mansfield
developed in its Canadian subsidiary may find its initialapplication in the
'firm's British subsidiary, and so on.
Fourth, the product life cycle is less valid than it used to be because
technology is becoming increasingly internationalized. For example, in
the pharmaceutical industry it is no longer true that a new drug is
discovered, tested, and commercialized all within a single country. In-
stead, the discovery phase often involves collaboration among laborato-
ries and researchers located in several different countries, even when
they are within the same firm. And clinical testing generally becomes a
multicountryproject. Evenin the laterphases ofdrug development, such
as dosage formulation, work often is done in more than one country. In
contrast, the product life cycle seems to assume that innovations are
carried out in a single country, generally the United States, and that the
technology resides exclusively within that country for a considerable
period after the innovation's initial commercial introduction. 11
6.7 "Reverse" Technology Transfer
"Reverse" technology transfer is the transfer oftechnology from over-
seas subsidiaries to their U.S. parents. Some analysts tend to dismiss
technology transfer ofthis sort as unimportant. Yet practically nothing is
known about the extent and characteristics of "reverse" technology
transfer, even though such information obviously would be of relevance
to publicpolicymakers concernedwith the technological and otheractivi-
ties of multinational firms.
To determine the extent to which overseas R&D by U.S.-based firms
has resulted in technologies that have b'een applied in the United States,
we obtained data pertaining to twenty-nine overseasR&D laboratories
of U.S. firms in the chemical, petroleum, machinery, electrical equip-
ment, instruments, glass, and rubber industries. This sample ofoverseas
laboratories, chosen essentially at random from those of major firms in
these industries in the Northeast United States, accounts for about 10
percent of all overseas R&D spending by U.S.-based firms. The indus-
trial and geographical distribution ofthe sample is reasonably similar to
the industrial and geographical distribution of all overseas laboratories
according to the National Science Foundation an.d other data sources.
12
The following four findings help to put "reverse" technology transfer
into betterperspective. First, over 40 percent ofthese laboratories' 1979
R&D expenditures resulted in technologies that were transferred to the
United States. Thus, such transfer is common and by no means insignifi-
cant. However, there arevast differences among overseas laboratories in
11. See Mansfield et al. (1982).
12. This work is being done with Anthony Romeo.139 R&D and Innovation
the percentage of R&D expenditures resulting in technologies trans-
ferred to the United States. Most of this variation can be explained by
three factors: (1) whetherthe laboratory's primaryfunction is to produce
technology for worldwide application, rather than to service or adapt
technology transferred from the United States or to produce technology
for foreign aplication; (2) the laboratory's totalR&D expenditures; and
(3) the percentage of its total R&D expenditures devoted to research
rather than development.
Second, there is a very short lag (on the average) between the date
when a transferred technology first is applied abroadand the datewhen it
is first applied in the United States. Indeed, in the electrical equipment
firms in our sample the average lag is negative. Because of the size and
richness of the American market, firms tend to introduce new products
(and processes) based on technologies developed in their overseas labo-
ratories aboutas quickly inthe UnitedStates as in theiroverseasmarkets.
These results indicate the extent to which firms take a global view ofthe
introduction of innovations. As pointed out in section 6.6, this is a
departure from the situation years ago.
Third, basedonourdata, more recently developed technologytends to
be transferred more quickly to the United States than technology de-
veloped years ago. Also, technologies yielding relatively large profit in
the UnitedStateswere transferred more quickly thanthose thatwere less
profitable here.
Fourth, although much oftheR&D carried outoverseas is directed at
the adaptation and improvement ofexisting technology, overseas R&D
laboratories have generated technology that was the basis for new prod-
ucts and otherinnovations thatcontributed billions ofdollars in profits to
U.S. manufacturing firms in 1980, if the laboratories in our sample are
representative in this respect.
6.8 Overseas R&D and Productivity Growth of U.S. Firms
As pointed out in section 6.7, "reverse" technology transfer is not
included (at least explicitly) in existing models ofR&D and productivity
growth. Indeed, because the official R&D statistics have excluded U.S.
firms' overseasR&Dexpenditures until recently, previousstudies ofthe
relationship between a firm's orindustry'sR&Dexpenditure andits rate
of productivity increase have ignored overseas R&D. Obviously, it
would be interesting and useful to include U.S. firms' overseas R&D in
such models andto see how much effect it has onthe productivity growth
of these firms.
To do this, it is convenient to use essentially the same model as that
employed by Mansfield (1968, 1980), Griliches (1980), and Terleckyj
(1974), except that research and development is disaggregated into two140 Edwin Mansfield
parts: domestic R&D and overseas R&D. In a particular firm, the
production function is assumed to be:
(2)
(4)
where Q is thefirm's value added, Rd is thefirm's stockofdomesticR&D
capital, Ro is its stockofoverseasR&D capital, L is its laborinput, andK
is its stock of physical capital. Thus, the annual rate of change of total
factor productivity is
(3) - \ 8 dRdldt + 8 dRoldt
P- I\. + 1-Q- 2-
Q
-'
where 81 == 8Q/8Rd, and 82 == 8Q/8Ro. And based on the usual
assumptions,13
\ X d X o P= I\. + arQ
+ ar Q,
where X d is the firm's domestic R&D expenditures, and X o is its
overseas R&D expenditures in the relevant year.
My econometric results pertain to fifteen chemical and petroleum
firms, for which I have estimated p for 1960-76 (see Mansfield 1980). For
each of these firms I obtained data concerning XdlQ and XoIQ. The
results are shown in table 6.5. 14 Estimates of al and a2 could be obtained
by least squares,15 the results being
(5) p == 0.022 + 0.19Xd1Q + 1.94XoIQ·
(7.40) (2.44) (1.90)
These results have at least two implications. First, they indicate that
overseas R&D, as well as domestic R&D, contributes to productivity
growth of U.S. firms. The estimate of a2 is positive and statistically
significant. More surprisingly, the estimate of a2 is much larger than that
ofaI, indicating that a dollar's worth ofoverseas R&D had much more
effect on productivity increase than a dollar's worth of domestic R&D.
But this difference is not statistically significant. For most firms, I doubt
that a2 is this much larger than aI, based on ourotherstudies. But be this
as it may, equation (5) certainly is consistent with our findings in section
6.7 concerning the nontrivial nature of "reverse" technology transfer.
13. These assumptions are described in detail in Mansfield (1980).
14. Onefirm includedin Mansfield (1980) could not be included here because it is partof
a foreign-based multinational firm. The data concerning XjQ and X)Q were obtained
from the firms.
15. Tests were carried out to determine whether an industry dummy variable should be
included in equation (5). The results provide no statistically significant evidence that this
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Table 6.5 Values of XdIQ, and XoIQ, Fifteen Chemical and Petroleum Firms
a

















Source: See section 6.8.
aThe data concerning XdlQ and XolQ pertain to a year in the mid-1960s (1963-65). It was
not possible to get data for precisely the same year, but the results should be sufficiently
comparable for present purposes.
Second, these results allow a first glimpse ofthe nature ofthe bias that
may have resulted from the omission ofoverseas R&D expenditures in
somepaststudies. IfXolQ hadbeenomittedfrom equation (5), the result
would have been
(6) p == 0.022 + O.28XdIQ.
(6.61) (3.95)
Thus, al would have been higher than if both overseas and domestic
R&Dwereincluded. IncaseswhereXolQ has beenpositivelycorrelated
with XdIQ, as in the presentinstance, the rate ofreturnfrom domestic R
& D may have been overestimatedin previous studies, since al has often
been interpreted as such a rate of return.
6.9 Imitation Costs, Patents, and Market Structure
In the previous three sections we have been concerned with the trans-
fer of technology from one nation to another, where the transferor and
transferee are oftenpartsofthesamefirm. Nowlet'sreturntotechnology
transfer within the same nation, where the transferor and transferee are
different firms, and where the transfer is involuntary from the point of
view of the transferor. In particular, suppose that one firm imitates
(legally) another firm's innovation. How much does it cost? How long
does it take? How often does it occur? Economists have long recognized
the importance of these questions. For example, they frequently have142 Edwin Mansfield
pointed out that, if firms can imitate an innovation at a cost that is
substantially below the cost ofdeveloping an innovation, they may have
little orno incentive to beinnovative. Yetno attempts have beenmade to
measureimitationcosts, to testvarious hypothesesconcerningthe factors
influencing those costs, or to estimate their effects.
To help fill this important gap, we obtained data from firms in the
chemical, drug, electronics, andmachineryindustriesconcerningthecost
and time of imitating (legally) forty-eight product innovations.
16 Imita-
tion cost is defined to include all costs ofdeveloping and introducing the
imitative product, includingapplied research, productspecification, pilot
plant orprototype construction, investment in plant and equipment, and
manufacturing and marketing start-up. (If there was a patent on the
innovation, the cost ofinventing around it is included.) Imitation time is
defined as thelength oftime elapsingfrom thebeginningofthe imitator's
applied research (iftherewas any) on the imitative productto the date of
its commercial introduction.
For present purposes, four findings of this study are of particular
interest. First, innovators routinely introduce new products even though
other firms can imitate these products at about two-thirds (often less) of
the cost and time expended by the innovator. In our sample, imitation
cost averages about 65 percent of innovation cost, and imitation time
averages about 70 percent of innovation time. Considerable variation
exists among products in the ratio of imitation cost to innovation cost.
Much of this variation can be explained by differences in the proportion
of innovation costs going for research, by whether an innovation was a
drug subject to FDA regulations, and by whether an innovation consists
of a new use for an existing material that is patented by another firm.
Second, the magnitude ofimitation costs in a particularindustry seems
to have a considerable impact on the industry's market structure. How
rapidly a particular innovation is imitated depends on the ratio ofimita-
tion cost to innovation cost. Also, an industry's concentrationlevel tends
to be low if its members' products and processes can be imitated easily
and cheaply. The latter relationship is surprisingly close. Apparently,
differences among industries in the technology transfer process (includ-
ing transfers that are both voluntary and involuntary from the point of
view ofthe innovator) may be able to explain much more ofthe interin-
dustry variation in concentration levels than is generally assumed.
Third, in most cases, patents seem to have only a modest effect on
imitation costs, as shown in table 6.6. However, in the drug industry,
patents seem to have a bigger impact than in otherindustries. According
to the firms, about one-half of the patented innovations in our sample
16. This work was done with Mark Schwartz and Samuel Wagner. Some of the results
appear in Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981).143 R&D and Innovation
Table 6.6 Estimated Percentage Increase in Imitation Cost Due to Patents,




















Source: See section 6.9.
aNot all innovations in our sample are included here because not all were patented or
patentable.
would not have been introduced without patentprotection. But the bulk
of these innovations occurred in the drug industry. Excluding the drug
industry, the lack of patent protection would have affected less than
one-fourth of the patented innovations in the sample.
Fourth, patented innovations seem to be imitated surprisingly often
and quickly. In our sample, about 60 percent were imitated within four
years of their initial introduction. Reality seems to depart sharply from
the commonly held belief that a patent holder is free from imitation for
the life of the patent. In my view, it is very important that this fact be
taken into account by the excellent economic theorists working in this
area, since sometimes models of the innovation process tend to assume
that the innovatorreceives all ofthe benefits from an innovation and that
imitation can be ignored.
6.10 Innovation and Market Structure
In recent years, economic theorists have also begun to focus on the
effects of innovation on market structure. Of course, technological
changehas long beenrecognized as oneofthemajorforces influencing an
industry's market structure. Karl Marx stressed this fact over a century
ago. Butthe renewed interest is welcome, since traditional models ofthe
relationship between innovation and market structure have been de-
ficient in many respects.
Unfortunately, empirical findings on this score have also been rela-
tively scanty. Little is known about the effects of recent major process
innovations in various industries on the minimum efficient scale ofplant.
Almost nothing is known about the effects of recent major product
innovations in various industries on the extent ofconcentration. To help144 Edwin Mansfield
fill this gap, I obtained information from twenty-four firms in the chemi-
cal, petroleum, steel, and drug industries about the effects ofover sixty-
five process and product innovations that were introduced in the past
half-century. 17
Although this study is still in a relatively early phase, several findings
are emerging. First, in the chemical and petroleumindustries, the bulkof
theprocessinnovationsresultedinincreasesinmiminumefficientscale of
plant. In steel, only about halfofthe processinnovations resulted in such
increases, butmostofthe resthad little orno effect on minimumefficient
scale. Thus, in all three industries,18 scale-increasing innovations far
outnumbered scale-decreasing innovations.
19 However, although rela-
tively few major innovations in these industries have reduced minimum
efficient scale, a substantial proportion have had no appreciable effect
on it.
Second,theevidenceoftheseindustriesdoesnotsupportBlair's (1972)
well-known hypothesis that, since World War II, fewer innovations tend
to increase minimum efficient scale than in the past. To test this hypoth-
esis, I compared the proportion of process innovations introduced after
1950 that resulted in such an increase with the proportion introduced
before or during 1950 that did so. Contrary to Blair's hypothesis, the
proportion was higher, not lower, in the later period.
Third, in all four industries combined, less than half of the product
innovations in the sampleseemedto increase the four-firm concentration
ratio. The percentage was particularly low in drugs. The fact that only a
minority of these major new products increased concentration in these
industries is noteworthy, given the common tendency among economists
to view technological change as a concentration-increasingforce. Ifthese
industries are at all representative (and ifthis preliminaryresult holds up
in my subsequent work), there should probably be more emphasis on
innovation's role in reducing and limiting existing concentration.
20
6.11 Conclusions
The findings presented here have a number of implications for public
policy. With respect to government R&D policy, they suggest the
following: (1) In their attempts to increase productivity, policymakers
should recognize the importance oflong-termR&D and basic research.
17. The lists of innovations came from Mansfield (1968), Mansfield et al. (1977), and
Landau (1980).
18. The drugindustrywas excluded here because ofits emphasis on productinnovation.
19. This seems to be in accord with the observed changes in minimum efficient scale in
these industries. See Scherer (1980).
20. In their paper on this subject, Nelson and Winter (1978) emphasize the concentra-
tion-increasing effects of innovation. However, they are careful to point out that their
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(2) Policymakers should also recognize that much of the apparent in-
crease in real industrial R&D during 1969-79 (which was relatively
modest in any event) may have been a statistical mirage, caused by the
lack of better price indexes for R&D inputs. (3) Changes in federally
financed R&D expenditures (at least in energy) are unlikely to be offset
to any appreciable extent by changes in privately financed R&D; on the
contrary, such changes seem to induce changes in the same direction in
privately financed R&D. (4)To the extent that policymakers want to
increase the spillover from federally financed to privately supported R &
D, the results suggest that firms should be encouraged to work with
government agencies in the design offederally financed R&D projects.
With respect to patent policy, the findings seem to suggest that, except
for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, patents frequently are
not regarded as essential by innovators. Excluding drug innovations,
more than three-fourths ofthepatentedinnovations in oursample would
have been introduced without patent protection. In a minority of cases,
patent protection had a very major effect on imitation costs and delayed
entry significantly, but in most cases it had relatively little effect.
Obviously, these findings have important implications concerning the
patent system's role in stimulating technological change and innovation.
With regard to antitrust policy, our findings shed new light on the
relationship between an industry's concentration level and the nature of
its technological activities. Highly concentratedindustriesseemto devote
a relatively low percentage oftheirR&D to basic research, and there is
an inverse (but not significant) relationship between an industry's con-
centration ratio and the percentage of its R&D that is long-term or
aimed at entirelynewproducts andprocesses. Also, ourresults (covering
the chemical, drug, petroleum, and steel industries) provide new in-
formation about the frequency with which major new products result in
increases in concentration. In our sample, many new products (particu-
larly in drugs) seem to have been introduced by firms that "invaded" the
relevantmarketorthatwere not amongtheleadersin thatmarket. This is
not to argue that innovations do not frequently increase concentration.
But it does suggest that the role of innovation in undermining existing
concentration may sometimes be underestimated.
With respect to national policies concerning international technology
transfer and the multinational firm, ourfindings underscore the extent to
which technology is transferred across national boundaries, the difficul-
ties and costs involved in trying to stem the technological outflow from
U.S. firms to their foreign subsidiaries, and the benefits to the United
States from the inflow oftechnology from these subsidiaries. "Reverse"
technology flows are becoming increasingly important. Based on our
econometricresults, overseasR&D has a considerable effect (per dollar
spent) on productivity of U.S. firms. These facts should be taken into146 Edwin Mansfield
accountin the evaluation ofthe role ofmultinational firms in contributing
to technological change and economic growth in the United States.
Our findings should also be of use to industrial managers. Faced with
the difficult task of choosing an R&D portfolio, managers badly need
evidence concerning the relationships between the composition of a
firm's R&D expenditure, onthe onehand, and its innovative outputand
rateofproductivityincrease, ontheother. Also, theyneedmoresophisti-
cated and reliable indexes ofthe rate ofinflation in R&D to budgettheir
resources properly, and they can benefit from improved techniques for
forecasting engineering employment.
Besides being of interest to policymakers, we believe that these
findings have some implications for economic analysis. In my opinion,
models relating R&D to productivity change should go further in
disaggregatingR&D, in takingaccountofinternationaltechnology flows
(and, in some cases, interindustry technology flows), and in using better
R&D price indexes. For many purposes, it may also be useful to view
government R&D e;tS a factor that expands the profitability of private
R&D. With regard to the role oftechnology in international trade, the
product life cycle model should be altered orsupplanted to recognize the
changes that have occurred in this area. Further, students of industrial
organization should devote more attention to the measurement and
analysis of imitation costs (and time); this is a central concept that has
been ignored entirely in econometric work.
In conclusion, the limitations of the studies described here should be
noted. Although many ofthe samples (offirms, R&D projects, innova-
tions, and so forth) are reasonably large, they nonetheless cover only
certain industries or sectors of the economy. In many instances, the
theoretical models we use are highly simplified. No pretense is made that
the findings presented here are the last words on the subject. However,
we believe that these findings increase our understanding of a wide
variety of major topics about which relatively little (often, practically
nothing) has been known.
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Comment Zvi Griliches
I agree with Mansfield about the potential importance of good R&D
deflators and I am glad to see him doing something about it. Some years
ago (as part of my work with the Census-NSF data, see Griliches 1980),
being in dire need of an R&D price index, I "constructed" one,
patterning it on the methodology of Jaffe (1972). The resulting index is
nothing but a weighted average (with almost equal weights) ofthe hourly
compensation index and the implicit deflator in the nonfinancial corpora-
tions sector. This index has two advantages over the usual overall GNP
deflator: (1) It is based on data from a more relevant subsector of the
economy. (2) It gives wage rates more weight, which is as it should be
since R&D is more labor intensive than the average corporate product.
The resulting index is shown in table C6.1. On Mansfield's base
1969 == 1.00; my index was at 2.01 in 1979, compared to Mansfield's
mean values in table 6.1 of1.98,2.01, and 2.00. I do not think one could
come closer if one tried. This would seem to indicate that this type of a
simple approximation may be pretty good, at least in recent years.
Nevertheless, it would be desirable if NSF orBLS would take onthe task
of constructing and keeping up-to-date an actual price index such as
Mansfield's.
Two additional brief notes: (1) Other attempts to construct an R&D
price index were undertaken by Goldberg (1979), Schankerman (1979),
andHalstead (1977). Theyall come outroughly in thesameplace: an R &
D input price index rises by more than the GNP deflator. (2) We are
considering here an R&D input price deflator. We have no data to
attempt an R&D output price deflator. It is not clear whether the
Zvi Griliches is professor of economics at Harvard University, and program director,
Productivity and Technical Charge, at the National Bureau of Economic Research.149 R&D and Innovation

















































Note: Index = .49 hourlycompensationindex + .51 implicit deflator, bothfor nonfinancial
corporations. (Valueof1957 hourlycompensationextrapolatedusing the hourlycompensa-
tion figures for the manufacturing sector.) Underlying data from U.S. Department of
Labor, Productivity and Costs in Nonfinancial Corporations, Washington, D.C., various
issues.
"productivity" of R&D has been growing or diminishing over time.
From a social pointofview it could be growing. Fromthe privatepointof
view of a company or a university it has probably been declining, in the
sense that to keep the same competitive edge, to stay in the sameposition
in the commercial or academic market, R&D laboratories today need
more expensive equipment, computers, and materials. Fromthe pointof
view of a laboratory director his real "costs" of R&D are rising faster
than is indicated by Mansfield's or my index.
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Comment George C. Eads
EdMansfield'spaperreflectsthewide rangeofresearchhehas conducted
onthetopicscoveredbythis conference. Hardlyasingle areahasfailed at
some time or another to attract his attention. Wherever he has chosen to
work, we are the richer for his contribution.
While it would be possible to evaluate each of the pieces of research
reported in this paper as an individual item, I believe it instructive to
group them into categories. This enables us not only to assess the items'
individual worth, but also to view Mansfield's research from a broader
perspective. Although others might be suggested, I propose a two-fold
divsion. The first division includes the works ofwhat I will refer to as the
"neoclassical" Mansfield; the second, the works of the "pragmatic"
Mansfield. The "neoclassical" Mansfield is a member of a group of
researchers who have attempted to apply neoclassical production func-
tions to the measurement ofthe determinants ofthe growth ofoutput (in
his case, concentrating on the role that technological change plays in
generating that growth). The "pragmatic" Mansfield is perhaps the lead-
ing exponent ofan ad hoc approach to investigating the microeconomics
oftechnological change. While his contributions in both areas have been
considerable, it is the latter body of his research that I have found to be
consistently the most provocative, raising questions about the way we
ought to approach the study of technical change and forcing us to reex-
amine our preconceptions.
Indeed, it often performs such a role in the research ofthe "neoclassi-
cal" Mansfield. Consider section 6.2, "Composition of R&D: Effects
and Determinants." Examination of the American Economic Review
piece from which this section is drawn reveals that the results reported
early in the section stem from the estimation of a neoclassical model
basedona Cobb-Douglasproductionfunction. Thedependentvariable is
value added by a given industry during period t. The independent vari-
ables are the industry's labor input, stock of physical capital, and two
kinds of R&D capital-basic and applied. After performing suitable
transformations and simplifications, Mansfield ends up with a single
equation model which he estimates under various specifications.
The coefficient associated with the basic research variable is found to
beconsistentlysignificant. Thesignificance ofthis coefficientleadsMans-
field to his principal conclusion: holding constant the amount an industry
spends on applied R&D, the higher the proportion of research that is
basic (orlong-term), the higher the rate ofproductivity over the 1948-66
period. (Mansfield's attempts to replicate these results using data from
the post-1966 period have proved unsuccessful.) Mansfield is well aware
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of the pitfalls in interpreting his results. In particular, the direction of
casuality is ambiguous. (These problems and their implications are dis-
cussed in more detail in the American Economic Review piece.) Yet the
finding, even qualified, is provocative.
Butthere is more, for the "pragmatic" Mansfield cannotresist having a
crack at the topic thatthe "neoclassical" Mansfield has opened. Nearthe
end ofthe American Economic Review piece (and in the third and fourth
summarypoints in section 6.2 ofthe paper), Mansfield reports the results
of arraying data he has collected concerning recent changes in the com-
position ofindustry R&D expenditures. (Since he is merely looking for
interestingconnections, heemploys simple correlation analysis andsome
multiple regressions.) I find his conclusions provocative: that there is a
critical distinction between basic (i.e., "long-term") research and what I
would term "breakthrough" research-research aimed at relatively new
products and processes. His results suggest that large firms do indeed
perform a disproportionately large share of the basic research, but they
perform a disproportionately small share of the "breakthrough" re-
search. He also finds little if any statistical relationship between changes
in the proportion of a firm's R&D expenditures directed to basic
research and changes in the proportion directed to "breakthrough" re-
search. Finally, he reports thevarious reasons cited by his survey respon-
dents for recent declines in the amount of"breakthrough" research they
fund.
At this point the section (and the American Economic Review piece)
ends. I wish it hadn't, for I would have liked to have seen results reported
in the latter part of the section related to those reported in the earlier
part. A number of interesting questions suggest themselves. For exam-
ple, "breakthrough" research would seem to be more amenable than
basicresearchto targetedincentives relatingto potentialrisk andreward.
Both this logic and Mansfield's findings suggest that the two categories
are likely to be affected quite differently by changes in underlying eco-
nomic conditions-inflation and regulation, for example. Butis one type
of research more likely to generate important advances in productivity
than the other? Are government policies designed to increase basic
research a substitutefor otherpolicies designed to increase risk taking of
the sort that leads to more "breakthrough" research?
This brings me to a more general point. Throughout the paper, Mans-
field characterizes his research as "gap filling." Yet I inevitably finish a
Mansfield study, especially one of the sort whose results are reported in
section 6.2, more aware of what we don't know about technological
change and more dissatisfied with our traditional approaches than con-
vinced that a "gap" has somehow been closed. I don't want to be
misunderstood. I yield to \10 one in my admiration ofMansfield's ability
to collect interesting data, to array them in provocative ways, and to spin152 Edwin Mansfield
out interesting hypotheses about what they might imply. But let's be
candid. Mansfield is not putting the finishing touches on a well-
understood edifice called "The Economics of Technical Change." In-
stead he-and the rest of us-are laboring at a far earlier stage; one in
which the surprises produced even by simple correlations might be
enough to cause us to go back to our plans to see if we are even
constructing the right structure. That Mansfield's work sends us back to
the drawing board more often than it produces a feeling of satisfaction
that a critical piece ofthe structure has been completed is not a criticism,
therefore, but a comment on the relatively primitive state of our knowl-
edge.
This gap creating tendency of much of Mansfield's research is illus-
trated by the sections of the paper that report on his excursion into the
world of international R&D. Just when we were despairing at our
inability to explain the causes ofour nation's poor productivity perform-
ance using purely domestic variables, Mansfield suggests through his
workthattheproblemmight beevenmorecomplexthanwe hadthought.
For not only must we understand the connections between domestic
variables, such as basic or applied R&D and the rate of technological
change and, ultimately, the rate of economic growth; we must also take
into account the flows of technology to and from the United States,
especially between the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. firms and their
domestic parents.
In section 6.6, Mansfield provides a framework for understanding the
various types ofinternational technology transfers. In section 6.7 Mans-
field begins to explore the gains to U.S. technology from research per-
formed overseas. In section 6.8 the "neoclassical" Mansfield again ven-
tures forth. Using a model identical in structure to the one whose results
are reported in section 6.2, he attempts to measure-albeit crudely-the
contribution of research performed overseas to U.S. productivity per-
formance for fifteen firms in the petroleum and chemical industries.
This time the R&D capital variable is divided not into "basic" and
"applied," but into "domestic" and "overseas." The results by Mans-
field's own admission are "surprising." Not only did overseas research
contribute significantly to productivityfor the firms in his sample, butthe
"bangfor the buck" is nearly ten times as great. Mansfield dismisses this
result since the two coefficients, though each significantly different from
zero, are notsignificantly differentfrom one another. I'msurprised atthe
model results in view ofthe fact that, according to table 6.5, eight ofthe
fifteen firms for which Mansfieldhas dataperformednooverseas research
at all during the periodunderinvestigation. The "bang" from thework of
those that did certainly must have been powerful.
Mansfield then takes his model one step further. He attempts to derive
an estimate of the possible "bias" from omitting the overseas research153 R&D and Innovation
variable by comparing the domestic coefficient in the two-factor R&D
model with one in which the overseas variable is excluded. The coef-
ficient in the latter is larger than in the former, leading him to conclude
that "the rate of return from domestic R&D may have been overesti-
matedin previousstudies"-includinghis, I presume. However, extreme
caution is required in this interpretation because, by my calculations, the
two coefficients are only marginally significantly different from each
other.
The paper reports on several other interesting bits ofresearch, mostly
representative of the "pragmatic" Mansfield. For example, there is an
attempt to measure the costs of imitation and, hence, the value of
patents. The implication of this work is that, except in limited areas,
patents provide surprisingly little protection to an inventor. The excep-
tion is the drug industry. Although Mansfield briefly refers to the poten-
tial impact ofFDAregulations onhis results, I'dlike to knowmore about
the possible interaction of FDA drug approval procedures and the effi-
cacy of patents.
Another interesting tidbit is contained in section 6.4 where Mansfield
attempts the analytically difficult task of separating out the effects of
federal support ofprivately financed R&D. His research seems to imply
an asymmetry. Each dollar's increasein federal R&D supportgenerates
only six cents additional privateR&D during the first two years andthen
zero thereafter. Buteach dollar cutin federal R&D support causes a fall
oftwenty-five cents in private support during each ofthe first oftwo years
and nineteen cents after the third year.
This and results reported later in the section suggest a finding contrary
to that reported by Mansfield-namely, that federal R&D support
exertsa growing, nota declining, influence overtimeonthecharacterofa
firm's R&D spending. If, as Mansfield contends, the federal influence
declines, I'd be hard pressed to explain the asymmetry he observes. But
again his results are preliminary, and we must await publication to
examine his detailed argument.
Taken as a whole, this paper and the articles and books it refers to,
both published and unpublished, reveal a highly productive research
organization, led by an extraordinary individual, investigating a remark-
able variety ofinteresting andimportanttopics. Theresearch methodolo-
gies employed by this organization are "problem driven," not "tool
driven," and that is indeed fortunate. The nature of the problems they
are investigating requires this. Indeed, it would be too bad if the "neo-
classical" Mansfield ever prevailed decisively over the "pragmatic"
Mansfield and imposed a rigid theoretical structure on the work of the
University of Pennsylvania team. The research would be less useful and
we would all be the losers.154 Edwin Mansfield
Reply Edwin Mansfield
Given George Eads's generous comments concerning my paper and the
research onwhich it is based, I feel no compulsion to take issue with him.
It seems to me that our "neoclassical" and "pragmatic" work (if one
accepts such a distinction) are linked together. Moreover, there clearly is
a general model or theoretical framework on which all our empirical
work is based. But he is quite right that this paper makes no attempt to
put thepieces together. Having said this, I would like to clarify two small
points. First, it is not quite true that attempts to replicate the results
concerning the effects of basic research on productivity growth, using
data from the post-1966 period, were unsuccessful. Although the fit is
much poorerthanin thepre-1966period, the regression coefficient ofthe
basic researchvariableis statisticallysignificant in anappreciablenumber
ofspecifications. Second, the apparent asymmetry in the effect offederal
support on privately financed R&D may well be due to chance. The
bigger apparenteffect ofa decrease thanofan increase in federal support
is attributable largely to a single firm in our sample. Although my paper
pointed out that this apparent asymmetry should be viewed with con-
siderable caution, I may have mislead Eads (and others) because my
language was notstronger. Putbluntly, theapparentasymmetrymaywell
be a fluke.
Turningto Zvi Griliches's commentonprice indexes for R&D inputs,
I thinkthatthecomparison hepresentsis interesting. Price indexes based
on proxies are valuable, if they are reasonably accurate, since they are
relatively cheap to construct. The Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development has also experimented with such indexes. In my
view, actualpriceindexesshouldperhapsbecombinedwith price indexes
basedonproxies. Forexample, actualprice indexes might beconstructed
for benchmark years, and price indexes based on proxies might be used
for interbenchmark years. I agree with Griliches that work should go
forward to construct and compare both types of indexes. Moreover, it
may well be that this work should be at the industry level, since there
seem to be interindustry differences in the rate of increase of the price
indexfor R&D inputs, a result apparentlyofinterindustry differences in
the types of R&D inputs used.